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INCOME SHOCKS, MORTGAGE REPAYMENT RISK AND FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS AMONG UK HOUSEHOLDS 
 
1.  Introduction 
It is widely accepted that household mortgage defaults to have played a major role in the 
origins of the current recessions in both the U.K. and the U.S. However, the causes of 
household mortgage repayment difficulties in these nations are under-researched. Few studies 
have, until recently, examined the causes of mortgage arrears, default and foreclosure, 
especially caused by adverse ‘shocks’ to household finances or by predictable events and 
circumstances.  Following the recent U.S. experience, howeverm a growing number of 
studies are emerging on the causes of mortgage defaults by U.S. households, including papers  
on the role of the structure of mortgage lending contracts in promoting foreclosures (White, 
2008; Foote, 2008), the foreclosure-price fall spiral, (Calormis, 2008) and  the option value of 
foreclosure to households (Bajari, 2008).  A large theoretical literature addresses mortgage 
default from an option-value perspective (see Deng et al., 2000) Perhaps surprisingly, fewer 
studies focus on the causes of repayment difficulties at the individual level, such as the role 
of falling incomes due to unemployment, increased debt burdens on the mortgage holder due 
to relationship breakdown, or reduced capacity for work caused by ill health.  
The absence of such studies for the U.S. has most likely arisen due to the lack of available 
data on such types of shocks to household income alongside data on household mortgage 
arrears and repayment difficulties. Individual-level, high frequency panel data on mortgage 
loan terms and performance is available from institutional sources, as in Bajari, 2008, but 
such sources lack information on socio-economic background and characteristics. Elsewhere 
household panel data is available in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), including 3 
 
household labour market participation, health status and finances, with some mortgage details, 
but not including data on repayment difficulties or mortgage arrears on a regular basis. Hence 
studies on mortgage repayment and default are limited to cross-sectional data, occasional 
surveys and institutional data with limited information on the forms of income household 
shocks which most likely cause default.  
By contrast, rich U.K. panel data is available on household mortgage borrowing and 
repayment performance, plus socio-demographic characteristics, labour market participation, 
health status and repayment of non-mortgage credit. This allows an analysis of the 
relationship between various forms of pre-purchase income risk and post-purchase income 
changes on household mortgage repayment difficulties. Existing studies have examined the 
relationship between changes in household income arising from a variety of sources (such as 
job loss, breakdown of the household unit and ill-health) on mortgage arrears and repayment 
for the U.K. (Boheim and Taylor, 2000; May and Tudela, 2005; Bridges and Disney, 2004) 
and for a panel of E.U. nations (Duygan and Grant, forthcoming).  
This paper offers two innovations to these existing studies. Firstly, it distinguishes 
between the types of ‘shocks’ which cause repayment difficulties. This is made possible by 
the range of information on socio-economic characteristics present in the BHPS. Secondly, 
the paper explores to what extent repayment difficulties are related to the underlying risk that 
households experience such a ‘shock’ at the point of purchase. Proxies for unemployment 
risk, ill health risk and relationship breakdown risk (at the point of purchase and based on a 
number of relevant instruments) are estimated and shown to be statistically and economically 
significant as predictors of mortgage repayment difficulties. These results raise pertinent 
questions about the extent of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and 
the efficiency of the mortgage lending process.  4 
 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) used here, modelled on the PSID, contains a 
series of detailed questions on self-reported household difficulties in paying for housing, on 
the burden of housing payments on the household’s budget and on the extent of arrears on 
mortgage payments. These questions are asked in every wave, together with questions on the 
respondent’s financial expectations over the coming year and financial experience over the 
previous year. As an annual household survey, the BHPS does not contain data on mortgage 
repayment performance of the same frequency as that held by mortgage lenders, but the 
combination of mortgage payment questions together with a broader set of economic 
covariates make this data suitable for a study on the causes of household repayment 
difficulties.  
The policy-relevance of research on the causes of mortgage repayment difficulties has 
rarely been more apparent. Difficulty meeting mortgage payments is one of the most 
significant causes of financial distress to households. Mortgage borrowing typically represent 
the largest debts owed by the households, are secured upon the most valuable durable good 
and single investment asset owned by the household and are the dominant debt service cost 
met by household income (on the magnitude of housing assets and debt in U.S. and U.K. 
household balance sheets see Banks et al., 2003). The welfare consequences of mortgage 
repayment difficulties, arrears and repossessions are potentially far reaching and long-lasting. 
As well as the prospect of eviction for households subject to repossession orders, households 
in arrears face growing debt-service costs in the short-term and suffer worsened credit ratings 
which induce supply constraints from lenders, making the return to home-ownership and 
access to all types of credit instrument more costly in the medium-term. Indeed, home-
owning households are more likely to achieve greater financial net worth in the long-term and 
benefit from greater opportunities for equity withdrawal which improve welfare in retirement 
(Sinai and Souleles (2007). Long-term home ownership has been shown to result in a range 5 
 
of socio-economic benefits to the household, including increased physical and mental 
wellbeing (Rossi and Weber, 1996) improved outcomes for children in the home-owning 
family unit (Green and White, 1997) and residence in neighbourhoods with greater social 
capital (Di Pasquale and Glasear, 1999). Hence mortgage repayment difficulties raise the 
prospect of serious decrements to long-term household welfare and heightened current 
financial stress. 
Mortgage arrears and repossessions can also present sizeable financial losses to 
lenders. During periods of real house price increases, the financial losses of household non-
repayment and subsequent repossession for the lender can be minimised, or even result in net 
gains to the lender. However, the majority of repossessions occur in periods of house price 
falls, which further encourage repossessions (Foote, 2008) and so present potentially sizeable 
losses to lenders and investors as the value of repossessed collateral diminishes and housing 
market supply is extended by repossession sales in an already falling market. Large losses 
experienced by lenders in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market in mid-2006 have been widely 
cited by the news media and academic literature as the predominant cause of the banking 
crisis of 2008 and subsequent global economic downturn and localised recessions which have 
followed (Jaffee,) Much of the growth in the U.S. housing market and the majority of 
foreclosures on U.S. mortgage loans can be attributed to the rise and fall of the sub-prime 
mortgage market in areas of the U.S. (Mian and Sufi, 2008). 
Despite the U.K. housing market having received less attention than the U.S. housing 
market in media coverage of the current recessions in both markets, concurrent with the rapid 
decline in the U.S. housing market and increase in foreclosure rates since early 2005, the U.K. 
has witnessed increasing rate of repossession orders and reported repayment difficulties on 
mortgage loans. Figure 1 illustrates the U.K. aggregate time series for repossession orders 
and substantial arrears (6-12 months) over the past 20 years. Figures for repossession orders 6 
 
are provided by the Ministry of Justice and represent orders brought against home owners 
approved by magistrates in England and Wales only. Figures for mortgage arrears are 
provided by the Council of Mortgage Lenders and refer to 1
st charge mortgages originated in 
the U.K. only. As the figure illustrates, repossession orders rose sharply in the early 1990s 
during the period of recession and housing market collapse in the U.K., trebling in number 
between 1989 and 1991 alongside a similar magnitude of increase in recorded mortgage 
arrears. Both measures decline gradually through the 1990s (repossession orders are issued 
against a property only once, whereas household perpetually exhibiting mortgage arrears will 
be recorded multiple times in the mortgage arrears series) before repossessions figures turn 
sharply again in late 2004 near the peak of the U.K. house price boom ahead of the current 
housing market decline. 
The response of U.K. government policy to rising arrears and repossessions by 
providing direct subsidies to households experiencing difficulties meeting mortgage 
payments has also mirrored that in the U.S. U.S. policy interventions in the mortgage market 
under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 2008 have sought to reduce foreclosure rates 
by offering new home loans to up to 400,000 U.S. households struggling to meeting the rising 
debt-service costs associated with reaching interest rate reset points. Under the scheme 
eligible existing mortgage holders can refinance onto a 30-year fixed rate mortgage at up to 
90% of the market value of the home (see White, 2008). In the U.K. government support is 
available to subsidise mortgage interest payments of unemployment households via Income 
Support for Mortgage Interest (with approximately 200,000 current claimants) and to allow 
households who suffer substantial falls in income to defer mortgage payments for up to two 
years (the Homeowner Mortgage Support Scheme). Both policies offer temporary relief and 
are based on the presumption that households have experienced temporary shocks to income 
or creditworthiness.  7 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarises the existing empirical literature 
on household debt repayment difficulties, arrears and distress. Section 3 outlines the basic 
econometric procedure for modelling financial distress and the instrumental variable 
approach adopted in this paper towards estimating ex ante repayment risk. Section 3 presents 
results, first for the income ‘shocks’ which appear to drive repayment difficulties and then for 
the relationship between repayment difficulties and measures of ex ante repayment risk. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Existing literature and empirical strategy. 
Studies in the existing literature explore the types of events, at the micro and macro 
level, combined with the institutional factors, which lead to households falling into arrears or 
reporting difficulties making mortgage repayments. Studies based on aggregate time series 
data emphasise the relevance of debt-to-income ratios, income gearing, interest rate 
movements and unemployment to mortgage arrears (Brookes et al, 1994; Figuiera, 2005). 
Institutional factors appear to play a role in explaining the wide cross-county pattern in 
mortgage arrears across European nations. Duygan and Grant (2006) calculate from the 
European Household Community Panel (ECHP) 1995-2001 that the proportion of households 
in arrears on at least one credit item ranges from less than 1% in Germany to 26% in Greece, 
arguing that this variation is in part attributable to variation in creditor rights across nations. 
They also find that shocks to household finances, such as unemployment, are more closely 
related to failure to repay loans in nations where information sharing is more limited. The 
scope for recourse available to creditors and extent of information sharing on financial shocks 
go some way to explaining variation in debt arrears across nations. 
While the cross-county pattern in debt and arrears may be explained by institutional 
differences, and macroeconomic changes impact upon reported household financial distress 8 
 
at the microeconomic level, recent studies also incorporate the importance of household-
specific adverse ‘shocks’ on debt repayment difficulties. Individual-level data allows the 
impact of macroeconomic changes across households to be quantified more precisely, such as 
observing individual unemployment events and the impact of interest rate changes on the 
debt servicing costs of particular households. The vulnerability of households to events 
arising at the macroeconomic scale, such as interest rate movements and structural 
unemployment, is in part determined by the household’s debt servicing cost and mortgage 
position. Adverse macroeconomic events bear more heavily on households with greater debt 
exposure and less scope for reducing debt service costs, variation which is not captured in 
aggregate measures of total indebtedness of income gearing. Hence utilising microeconomic 
data allows for a more accurate evaluation of the impact of both ‘macroeconomic’ and micro-
level shocks on household debt and arrears. 
Two recent studies for the U.K. examine the causes of household debt and arrears 
utilising household surveys which include questions on repayment difficulties, value and time 
in arrears on debt obligations and self-reported measures of financial distress – questions 
typically not asked in large-scale U.S. household surveys. Firstly, Bridges and Disney (2005) 
examine repayment difficulties on a range of secured and unsecured credit instruments 
among a two-wave panel of low-income households in the U.K. They find a range of socio-
economic characteristics are associated with cross-sectional variation in repayment 
difficulties and arrears, such as renter/tenant housing tenure, age, labour market status, 
household size, education and health. Similar findings are presented in a number of studies 
utilising cross-sectional data by Burrows (refs in Boheim here). Also, utilising the short-panel, 
the authors note a low observed year-on-year persistence in self-reported arrears, with only 
30% of households who reported debt problems in the first wave also reporting debt problems 
in the second wave. Despite the low persistence of arrears and repayment difficulties, 9 
 
elsewhere the authors find that where arrears appear persistent, they are more commonly 
related to persistent self-reported psychological distress (Bridges and Disney, 2006), a 
finding supported by Brown et al (2005). 
Secondly, and as a background to this study, Boheim and Taylor (2000) examine 
housing payment difficulties and evictions among mortgage-holding homeowners, private 
tenants and social tenants utilising the panel component of the BHPS between 1991 and 1997. 
Their results corroborate with the findings from cross-section studies that a number of 
underlying factors are significantly related to the likelihood of a household reporting arrears 
on housing payments and, ultimately, on the likelihood of eviction. They also show that 
unexpected changes in financial circumstance increase the likelihood of self-reported 
repayment difficulties. In each wave, the BHPS questions respondents on how they expect 
their financial situation to evolve over the coming year – whether it will improve, worsen or 
stay about the same. A similar question is asked in retrospect about the financial experience 
of the household over the previous year. Using these questions in combination, their analysis 
shows that, conditional on household characteristics including income, employment status 
and household size, a worse-than-expected financial experience over the previous year 
increases the likelihood of self-reported repayment difficulties. However, the authors do not 
explore the types of ‘shocks’ which might cause these changes or the predictability of such 
events. These topics are the focus of this paper.  
Understanding the types of events which might constitute such unanticipated financial 
disappointments which bear on the household’s ability to meet mortgage payments, and to 
what extent they can indeed be interpreted as ‘shocks’ is the objective of this study. A variety 
of factors which decrement household income or increase household debt service costs can 
potentially in isolation, or combination, cause repayment difficulties. Most obviously, 
reductions in household income caused by a period of unemployment, or reduced capacity for 10 
 
work arising from ill-health increase the debt burden upon a household. Alternatively, the 
breakdown of the household unit through divorce or relationship breakdown may increase the 
debt burden on a particular member of the household, most likely the member in who is a 
liable for mortgage repayments. Changes in household expenditure needs arising from, for 
example, the addition of children to the household might also cause repayment difficulties. 
Increases in mortgage payments due to rising mortgage interest rates of the failure on the part 
of the household to refinance their existing mortgage at the interest rate reset point may also 
cause repayment difficulties. It is relatively straightforward to observe such changes in 
household circumstances which we might think cause repayment difficulties in household 
panel data.  
A more complex issue is whether such changes can be considered ‘shocks’, 
specifically, whether such changes were unpredictable at the point at which the mortgage 
contract was agreed. As described in the next section, the majority of reported mortgage 
payment difficulties on the part of households occur within the first few years of a contract, 
and increase in likelihood with the most of the recorded adverse events described above. At 
any point in time, including the time of taking out a mortgage, households vary in the 
likelihood of experiencing an adverse shock, such as unemployment or relationship 
breakdown. However, a household’s ‘repayment risk’ evaluated at the time of origination, 
either as income risk or the risk of an adverse event, is normally unobserved. Lending 
decisions are based on observed credit ratings, which are a backward-looking measure of 
prior loan performance. Forward-looking measures of income risk are typically not employed 
due to lack of information. Indeed, even in-depth household surveys typically do not question 
respondents in detail about the likelihood of unemployment, marital dissolution or ill-health, 
(the BHPS does include a question on unemployment expectations but this is only asked in 11 
 
waves six and seven). Hence we cannot directly observe even a self-reported measure of 
repayment risk. 
The search for appropriate instruments for ‘repayment risk’ in its many potential 
forms thus poses the challenge of finding observable characteristics associated with an 
underlying risk of income loss, job loss, relationship breakdown and so on. Here is it possible 
to borrow an approach taken in the literature which seeks to evaluate income risk for the 
purposes of estimating levels of precautionary wealth. Studies on precautionary saving have 
typically used the variability of household income (Carroll and Samwick, 1998), variability 
of expenditures, (Dynan, 1993) or, in one case, a direct question on unemployment risk 
(Benito, 2005). A further approach adopted by Carroll (1999), utilised here, is to instrument 
uncertainty in income using variables such as occupation, industry of employment and region 
of residence. Such variables most likely impact upon unemployment risk, and the relationship 
between these characteristics and unemployment can be estimated using a sample including 
households who experience an unemployment event. Based on an estimated empirical model, 
unemployment risk can be imputed for households who have not experienced such an event 
based on the observed characteristics. 
Of course, proper econometric identification requires that an instrument for income 
uncertainty can be found which is related to the outcome of interest (in the case of the 
precautionary savings literature, savings of wealth; in this case, mortgage repayment 
difficulty) solely through the instrument’s correlation with uncertainty. Such an instrument 
can then be legitimately omitted from a second-stage regression (Carroll, 1999). The 
approach of this study, therefore, is to use variables correlated with income uncertainty, 
marital breakdown uncertainty and ill-health uncertainty which are observable for all 
households prior to the mortgage contract being originated and on which basis measures of ex 
ante  repayment risk can be imputed using an empirical model estimated on the sample 12 
 
including households which experience unemployment, relationship breakdown and ill-health. 
A variety of instruments are utilised and overidentification is tested for. 
It could be argued that mortgage lending and borrowing decisions are endogenous to 
household repayment risk in these various forms. If lenders can evaluate the repayment risk 
of their potential customers, we might expect that riskier borrowers will be denied credit or 
limited in their borrowing. Hence we might think that households with higher repayment risk 
will either be more cautious in their mortgage borrowing or less likely to obtain mortgage 
finance from a lender. Indeed, if ex ante repayment risk were perfectly observed by lenders 
we might expect that mortgage lending decisions optimally price such risk and no ex post 
correlation with non-repayment would exist. Therefore part of the interest of this study is to 
estimate whether, for households who have been granted mortgage contracts, such ex ante 
measures, conditional on contracting, do predict subsequent repayment problems. The extent 
to which they do can be considered an indication of whether observed adverse ‘shocks’ to 
households occurring after purchase are best considered as shocks or rather reflect imperfect 
functioning of the mortgage lending process. 
3. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
This section describes and summarises the UK household data set used in the analysis. 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) used here is an annual panel survey of 
approximately 10,000 adults in around 5,000 households that has been running since 1991.  
Aside from standard questions concerning household demographics, health and economic 
status, the BHPS in every wave collects information on secured debt, on housing status and 
self-assessed house value.  The survey obtains detailed information on mortgaging and 
remortgaging, as well as year-on-year self-reported house values.  The mortgage data 
contains data on type of mortgage, original mortgage value, the regular value of mortgage 13 
 
payments, and the current estimated value of the mortgage. In addition, the BHPS asks 
respondents in each wave about difficulties meeting mortgage repayments. An initial non-
specific question is asked about problems paying for housing: ‘Many people these days are 
finding it difficult to keep up with their housing payments. In the last twelve months would 
you say you have had any difficulties paying for your accommodation?’ If respondents say 
yes to this question, they are then asked whether in order to meet housing payments they had 
to i) borrow or ii) make cutbacks and whether over the course of the previous year they had at 
any point been at least two months behind with a rental or mortgage payments. Figure 1 plots 
the proportion of BHPS mortgage-holding households who responded positively to the initial 
non-specific question on problems paying for housing between 1991 (the first year of the 
BHPS) and 2007. This statistic closely follows the aggregate series for the proportion of 
households with mortgages 6-12 months outstanding obtained from Council of Mortgage 
Lenders (CML) data. 
The interest of this study is limited to mortgage-holding households only; hence 
renters are omitted from the sample from the outset. Among mortgage holders, the majority 
of reported instances of payment problems for households in the BHPS occur within the first 
few years after purchase. 70% of positive responses to the housing payment problem question 
are from households in their first five years of a mortgage contract, and 90% from households 
within the first 8 years. Given that the majority of problems occur in the early years of a 
contract, and that the focus of the study is on the relationship between ex ante repayment risk 
and subsequent repayment difficulties, the sample is limited to a panel of mortgage-financed 
house purchases observed over a seven year period, from the year before purchase, the year 
of purchase and five subsequent years. This sample captures 83% of the total observations of 
problems paying for housing among mortgage holding homeowners in the BHPS.  14 
 
Taking this selection criteria, and removing households for which covariates used in 
the analysis are not observed, the sample is reduced to a balanced panel of 1,411 households 
observed for seven years, ranging between 1991-1997 and 2000-2006 (2006 is the most 
recent wave of the BHPs available at the time of writing). The composition of the sample is 
described in Table 1. Although the BHPS is a panel survey, the sample is refreshed each 
wave such that any individual wave can be analysed as a representative cross-section of the 
British population. Hence the mean age of the household head among home purchasing 
households does not rise over the period. Between 20 and 30 percent of the sample are first-
time buyers in each wave. The order of events in which households are observed prior to 
house purchase, purchase occurs and subsequent observations of the household are recorded 
is illustrated in Figure 2. Initial characteristics, ‘characteristics before purchase’ are observed 
for purchasers in the wave prior to the year of purchase, time t-1. Over the course of the 
following year purchase occurs, and at time t=0 purchase details, such as house value and 
mortgage value at observed. The next five observations t=1, t=2 etc. are post-purchase.  
Table 2 describes the average rates of self-reported repayment difficulties by number 
of years since purchase for households present in the sample. Two patterns in the data are of 
note. Firstly, more households report problems paying for housing than report actual 
mortgage arrears, as might be expected. Fewer than one percent of households report that 
they are 2+ months late with mortgage payments, compared with more than 4 percent of 
households reporting problems paying for housing over the first four years since purchase. 
There is a likely ordering of severity of repayment difficulties. Secondly, by all of the 
measures of payment difficulty, observed difficulties peak within the first three years. The 
rate of reported problems paying for housing is approximately 40 percent lower in the fifth 
year after purchase compared to the first year after purchase. As the footnote to this table 15 
 
describes, this pattern is not apparently due to a high rate of attrition from the sample among 
households reporting repayment difficulties.  
Table 3 also confirms that the distribution of reported payment problems is not 
centred upon observations of years of purchase during the housing market slump of the early 
1990s. Comparing 1991 purchasers to 2001 purchasers, the rate of self-reported payment 
difficulties is approximately one third greater in the earlier period. Finally, Table 4 describes 
the frequency of households reporting problems paying for housing. Notably, the majority of 
households who report a repayment difficulty do so only once, and nearly 80% of those 
reporting problems do so once or twice. Very few households persistently report payment 
problems, with only one household reporting repayment problems in all six years post-
purchase.   
4. Results 
This section analyses the relationship between household type, mortgage 
characteristics, income shocks and subsequent self-reported payment difficulties. As 
described in the previous section, the BHPS includes a rich set of questions on labour market 
status, household demographic and educational characteristics and financial data. Table 5 
compares households reporting payment problems with those not reporting payment 
problems for a variety of characteristics. From the p-values of the difference in means, 
households reporting payment difficulties differ significantly from those not reporting 
payment difficulties in terms of their age (being typically younger), marital status (less likely 
married, more likely divorced) and the number of dependent children in the household. As 
might be expected, households reporting payment problems exhibit a higher mortgage cost as 
a proportion of monthly income and lower levels of monthly income. Households reporting 16 
 
mortgage repayment problems are exhibit higher rate of reporting problems paying consumer 
credit as a burden. 
Turning to changes in financial circumstance since purchase, households reporting 
payment problems show statistically significantly greater rates of reporting a negative 
financial shock in the same wave, and lower rates of reporting a positive financial shock in 
the same wave, as documented by Boheim and Taylor (2000). This in itself is not surprising. 
The final section of the table includes variables which capture adverse events affecting the 
mortgage holder’s ability to meet payment, which one might think represent that financial 
shocks captured by the previous question.  A series of 1/0 dummy variables are created which 
takes a value of 1 if i) the head of household has experienced a spell of unemployment (at 
least one month) since purchase ii) the head of household has divorced or separated from 
his/her partner or spouse since purchase iii) new dependent children have been added to the 
household since purchase iv) the head of household has become long-term sick, or 
experienced a period of long-term sickness since purchase and finally v) the head of 
household has reported that consumer credit payments have become a burden in at least one 
wave since purchase. Households reporting payment problems exhibit significantly higher 
rates of each of these ‘adverse events’, except new dependent children. 
The short-panel dataset (6 waves of observations, including the ‘at purchase’ wave), 
together with the possibility that households move into and out of reporting repayment 
problems means a hazard structure is unsuitable for understanding the relationship between 
household characteristics/changes and payment problems. An alternative option is to exploit 
the within-household variation in the panel, using household fixed effects. However, a fixed 
effects model would imply a simultaneous timing of events from a change in household 
circumstances to the reporting of repayment problems. It is more likely that changes in 
circumstances might lead to financial distress with a time lag, or even after the change in 17 
 
circumstance has reversed. For example, a period of unemployment might result in 
households eroding precautionary wealth over a period of time and entering arrears / 
repayment problems with a time lag, or plausibly having found new but insufficiently-paying 
employment. Hence a fixed-effects estimator places to strict a structure on the feed-through 
of ‘events’ to repayment problems. 
Consequently, the approach taken here is to estimate a random effects probit model, 
pooling household-observations over the 6 year period. Results are presented in Table 6. 
Column 1 includes only household and mortgage characteristics at the time of purchase. 
Households with a self-employed head, more dependent children and lower incomes are more 
likely to report subsequent repayment problems. Higher Loan-to-income (LTI) and Loan-to-
value (LTV) purchases also raise the likelihood of problems, as do first-time purchases. 
Notably, council house sales (right-to-buy purchases, which commonly involve a discount 
price compared to open market value of the property) are less likely to result in repayment 
problems. 
Columns 2 and 3 include ‘shocks’ to household circumstances. Column 2 includes the 
change in household income, which is the simple difference between current income and 
income at purchase. Falling household income increases the likelihood of repayment 
problems. Column 3 omits this measure of change in income and instead includes changes in 
circumstance which one might expect yield falling income. Unemployment, 
divorce/separation and the development of long-term sickness since purchase are all 
significant in the estimates and increase the likelihood of repayment problems. By way of 
quantifying these effects, the baseline predicted probability of repayment difficulty from the 
regression is 0.021. Hence a household head experiencing unemployment approximately 
doubles the likelihood of the household reporting repayment problems. The effect of 
becoming long-term sick is approximately being half as strong again (the stronger effect 18 
 
possibly attributable to long-term sickness indicating a permanent reduction in income 
compared to the temporary impact on income of unemployment). The effect of marital 
divorce or separation dwarfs both unemployment and long-term sickness, increasing the 
likelihood of repayment problems by a factor of seven. The positive and significant 
coefficient on a 1/0 dummy variable for whether the household has reported difficulties 
repaying consumer credit since purchase further indicates the correlation between problems 
meeting mortgage payments and difficulties meeting consumer credit commitments. 
These results indicate that unemployment, long-term sickness and divorce / 
relationship breakdown significantly raise the likelihood of a household reporting repayment 
difficulties, conditional on both characteristics of the loan and initial characteristics of the 
household. As discussed earlier, such events might constitute either a unpredictable ‘shock’ 
to the household or an ex ante predictable event. To estimate the impact of ex ante 
unemployment risk, ill-health risk and divorce / separation risk on subsequent repayment 
problems, the instrumental variables procedure described in Section 2 is implemented using 
additional information about household characteristics prior to purchase. The IV strategy is to 
construct a proxy measure of each form of ‘risk’ based on the relationship between a set of 
instruments and observed unemployment, ill-health and separation among households in the 
sample. Instruments are chosen as follows: for unemployment, industry of work (SOC 
classification), region of residence and years in current job; for separation, whether the 
cohabiting couple are married, the age of the youngest child in the family unit and number of 
years since the relationship began; for long-term sickness, the number of existing health 
conditions reported by the head of household and the number of time the head of household 
visited his/her GP over the course of the previous year. 
The IV strategy is implemented as follows: pooling all observations of BHPS 
households present in at least two consecutive waves of the BHPS in the period 1992-2001 19 
 
random effects probit models are estimated for whether the household becomes unemployed, 
long-term sick or separated in year t based on characteristics plus the sets of instruments 
observed in year t-1. From the coefficient estimates, the predicted probability of each event 
occurring is calculated for each BHPS household present in the panel of homeowners based 
on characteristics in the year before purchase. As all the information contained in the proxy 
measures of ‘risk’ is observed pre-purchase, it is referred to as an ex ante measure of 
repayment risk. These predicted probabilities are then used in the second-stage regression for 
whether the household reports problems paying for housing over the course of the next 6 
years (the same regression as in Table 6 but with the proxy measures of risk now replacing 
observed events for the household). The proxy measure of ‘risk’ is the predicted likelihood of 
the event occurring in the next year. Table 7 reports F-statistics for the instruments used in 
the first-stage regressions. All instruments are statistically significant at the 5% level (some 
instruments might be considered ‘weak’ – region of residence for unemployment and number 
of times visited GP for ill-health). Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the proxy measures 
of risk across households. 
Results from the second-stage regressions are reported in Table 8. The second-stage 
regressions retain a common set of covariates from table Table 7, but in this specification the 
variables relating to unemployment, long-term sickness and separation are the risk proxies 
evaluated at the year before purchase. Hence all the information in the regressions in Table 8 
is pre-purchase. The model in Column 1 is estimated over all households and includes the 
proxy measures of unemployment risk and long-term sick risk. Column 2 includes the 
measure of ‘separation risk’ and is estimated over married/cohabiting couples only (as non-
cohabiting household heads exhibit zero risk of separation. None of the recorded house 
purchases are undertaken by unemployed household heads or long-term sick household heads, 
so this selection is not necessary for households in Column 1).  20 
 
In Column 1 both the unemployment risk and long-term sick risk proxies are 
positively signed and statistically significant at the 1% level. To quantify the marginal effect 
on unemployment risk of 0.510, the baseline predicted probability from the regression is 
0.0257, mean unemployment risk 0.0103 and the standard deviation of unemployment risk 
0.01. Hence a one standard deviation increase in unemployment risk increases the likelihood 
of reporting problems paying for housing by 25%. The same calculation for the proxy 
measure of risk of long-term sickness (mean 0.021, standard deviation 0.014) implies a one 
standard deviation increase raises the likelihood of reporting problems paying for housing by 
13%. In Column 2 the coefficients on unemployment risk and long-term stick risk are little 
changed. The marginal effect on separation risk in this regression implies a one standard 
deviation increase raises the likelihood of repayment problems by 20% (mean 0.107, standard 
deviation 0.0070. The simulated impact of higher risk characteristics among households at 
the time of purchase therefore implies a non-negligible increase in the likelihood of reporting 
subsequent repayment difficulties. 
What are the implications of these results for understanding household financial 
distress and the efficacy of mortgage lending decisions? The non-negligible predictive power 
of the ex ante repayment risk measures could be taken as indicative of inefficiencies within 
the mortgage lending/borrowing decision. If optimal lending pricing and allocation of credit 
implies no relationship between characteristics at purchase and subsequent repayment 
difficulties, the predictive power of the risk measures suggests imperfections in the lending 
process. It might also suggest sub-optimal borrowing decisions on the part of some borrowers, 
who, for given characteristics of a loan (LTI, LTV etc controlled for in the analysis) face 
greater likelihood of repayment difficulties due to their underlying risk of experiencing an 
‘income shock’ of the type stylised in the regressions. 
 21 
 
  5. Conclusion 
  The U.K. economic experience in the period covered by this analysis, 1992 to 2001, 
was characterised by a housing market ‘bust’ and economic downturn followed by an upturn 
in the economy and beginnings of a robust and sustained house price boom, which has now 
once more turned to bust. Prevailing macroeconomic conditions evidently go some way to 
explaining the greater prevalence of financial distress and arrears in the earlier part of the 
period. However, the analysis highlights that throughout this period house-purchasing 
households are observed to report repayment problems, typically in the first few years 
following purchase. However, occurrences of financial distress appear non-persistent, with 
only a small proportion of households who report financial distress doing so perpetually over 
the 6 year period of observation.  
  The analysis indicates that problems meeting housing payments are related to both the 
extent of household borrowing and level and ‘riskiness’ of household income and 
commitments. Measures of leverage and gearing of household mortgage borrowing are 
positively correlated with repayment problems, as is a lack of experience in mortgage 
markets and lower income. However, the changes in household status pertaining to income 
and financial commitments are shown not just to be significantly related to payment problems, 
but to a non-negligible extent predictable on the basis of household characteristics prior to 
purchase. This raises questions about the efficiency of the mortgage lending process. 
One possibility forwarded here is that the information on household characteristics 
and histories available in the BHPS is much richer than the information typically obtained by 
lenders either by mortgage applications or via credit score data. The risk proxies used in the 
analysis were estimated using instrumental variables typically not known to the lender: 
details of labour market status and profession, health status and details of marital and 22 
 
relationship status. All of the risk proxies are based on non-financial information of a type 
which lenders might not be able to readily obtain from borrowers. The implication of the 
analysis is that such information about the applicant – the security of their job, robustness of 
their health and stability of their relationships – might, perhaps unsurprisingly, have a 
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Figure 1
Mortgages  Repayment Difficulties, Arrears And Repossesion Orders, 
U.K. Housing Market and BHPS Sample.
Percentage of all U.K. Mortgages 6-12 months oustanding (left-hand scale).
Percentage of BHPS mortgage-holding households reporting repayment difficulties (left-hand scale).
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Table 1 
New Home Buyers, 1992-2001 by Frequency and Age  
Year of 
Purchase 




Mean Age of 
Household 
Head 
1992 145  7.5 45.2 
1993 105  12.1 42.7 
1994 135  30.3 40.1 
1995 148  20.2 44.0 
1996 134  27.6 43.7 
1997 133  24.1 40.2 
1998 172  24.4 41.5 
1999 142  32.3 42.2 
2000 153  35.9 43.6 
2001 141  34.7 43.8 
 
Table 2 
Financial Distress and Repayment Difficulties Among House Buyers 

























In This Year Having 
Reported Problems 
Paying Last Year 
(%) 
0 0.049  0.039  0.009  0.004  - 
1 0.052  0.038  0.009  0.006  0.003 
2 0.050  0.031  0.005  0.008  0.003 
3 0.045  0.021  0.005  0.005  0.002 
4 0.040  0.017  0.005  0.004  0.002 
5 0.031  0.009  0.002  0.0004  0.001 
 
Sample composed households who remained in survey for 5 years only. Five-year attrition rate among 
households never reporting a repayment problem is 30%. Five-year attrition rate among households 
who report a repayment problem in at least one wave following house purchase is 18%. 
 
Table 3 
Problems Paying for Housing, 1991 Purchasers  
Compared To 2001 Purchasers  
Years After 
House Purchase 
Home Buyers in 1991 
Problems Paying for 
Housing  
(%) 
Home Buyers in 2001 
Problems Paying for 
Housing  
(%) 
0 0.055  0.042 
1 0.041  0.035 
2 0.048  0.028 
3 0.048  0.031 
4 0.042  0.025 
5 0.031  0.020 




Frequency of Reporting Problems Paying 




1,411 Home Buyers over 6-









At least 1  263 
 
Table 5 












Demographics & Education      
Age 38.9  44.2  0.0000 
Male head  0.54  0.49  0.1026 
Married 0.79  0.87  0.0001 
Divorced 0.11  0.05  0.0000 
Ethnic Minority  0.02  0.02  0.7559 
A-level 0.15  0.17  0.3916 
Degree 0.13  0.15  0.3301 
Employed 0.63  0.67  0.2313 
Unemployed 0.03  0.01  0.0057 
Number of Dependent Children  1.13  0.74  0.0000 
Long-Term Sick  0.02  0.01  0.0182 
No. Health Problems  1.03  0.94  0.2662 
      
Income and Household Finances      
Gross Household Monthly Income  2011  2507  0.0000 
Mortgage Cost as % Income  0.59  0.30  0.0000 
Consumer Credit Payments a Burden  0.82  0.32  0.0000 
Negative Financial Shock, This Year  0.29  0.19  0.0000 
Positive Financial Shock, This Year  0.54  0.71  0.0000 
      
Changes in Household & Employment       
Became unemployed since purchase  0.03  0.01  0.0001 
Divorced / Separated since purchase 0.06  0.01  0.0000 
New dependent children since purchase  0.03  0.02  0.1365 
Became long-term sick since purchase  0.01  0.00  0.0004 
Consumer credit problems, since purchase  0.28  0.20  0.1519 
      
N 263  6403   
Note: 1,411 households observed over 5 years following house purchase.  28 
 
Table 6 
Probit Estimates for Household Mortgage Repayment Difficulties 
Characteristics at Purchase and Subsequent ‘Shocks’.  
Dependent Variable: 
‘Problems Paying For Housing’ 
Estimator: 










Purchase Plus Other 
‘Shocks’ 
Characteristics Year Before 
Purchase: 
          




-0.0002  -0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.0002  -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.0002 




0.006  0.09 
(0.07) 







0.005  0.03 
(0.08) 





    0.36** 
(0.12) 
0.03      0.39** 
(0.12) 







-0.006  -0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.006  -0.12 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
No. of Dependent Children 
 
    0.10** 
(0.03) 
0.006      0.10** 
(0.03) 
0.006     0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.005 
Household Income (£s) 
 
  -0.01** 
(0.002) 
-0.0008    -0.01** 
(0.002) 
-0.001    -0.01** 
(0.002) 
-0.0006 
Characteristics of Purchase:             
Council House Sale 
 
   -0.27** 
(0.11) 
-0.01    -0.28** 
(0.11) 
-0.01    -0.23** 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
First Time Buyer 
 
    0.48** 
(0.07) 
0.04     0.47** 
(0.07) 
0.04     0.49** 
(0.07) 
0.04 
Loan-to-Value Ratio {0,1} 
 
    0.34** 
(0.14) 
0.02      0.36** 
(0.14) 





  0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.004    0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.004   0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.004 
‘Changes’ Between Purchase Year 
and Current Year 
          
Change in Household Income 
 
-  -     -0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.004  -  - 
Unemployment  
 










- -  -  -  0.40** 
(0.16) 
0.03 
New Dependent Children 
 
- -  -  -  0.004 
(0.06) 
0.0001 
Began Reporting Difficulties 
Repaying Consumer Credit 
-  -  -  -      0.62** 
(0.09) 
0.06 
No. Observations  7055  7055  7055 
Pseudo R
2 0.10  0.13  0.14 
LR Χ
2 233.32  240.11  317.14 
Prob> χ
2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Log Likelihood  -991.26  987.87  -948.10 
Notes to Table 6: Coefficients, (Standard Errors), Marginal Effects. Denotes significance at **1%, *5% level. 
7055 observations of 1,411 households over 5 years following purchase year. Dependent variable is dummy 
variable for whether the head of household reports problems paying for housing in current year. ‘Characteristics 29 
 
Year Before Purchase’ are recorded in wave prior to wave in which purchase is reported. Probit estimates also 
include a dummy variable for whether the head of household is a member of an ethnic minority, dummy 
variables for educational qualifications of household head (hnd, o-levels or equivalent, a-levels and degree), 
dummy variables for labour market status of household head (employed, unemployed) and time dummies for 
year of purchase.  
 
Table 7 
First-Stage Estimation Results For 
Unemployment Risk, Separation Risk and Health Risk Proxy Measures 





Becoming Divorced / Separated 
 
Becoming Long-Term Sick 
Industry 
 





0.0300  Age Youngest Child  0.0000  No.  Times  Visited 




0.0015  Years in Relationship  0.0000     
          
Mean Pr(y*)  0.012 
 
Mean Pr(y*)  0.010  Mean Pr(y*)  0.021 
Std. Dev. Pr(y*)  0.061 
 
St. Dev. Pr(y*)  0.07  St. Dev. Pr(y*)  0.012 
          
N. Observations 
 
































































Probit Estimates for Household Mortgage Repayment Difficulties Based On 
Characteristics and Risk Proxy Measures at Year Before House Purchase 
Dependent Variable: 
‘Problems Paying For Housing’ 
Estimator: 





Co-Habiting Heads of 
Household Only 
Characteristics Year Before 
Purchase: 
      




-0.0002  -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.0003 

























-0.006  -0.13 
(0.06) 
-0.007 
No. of Dependent Children 
 
   0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.006  0.12** 
(0.03) 
0.007 
Household Income (£s) 
 
   -0.01** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006  -0.01 
(0.002) 
-0.0006 
Characteristics of Purchase: 
 
       




-0.013  -0.29** 
(0.11) 
-0.014 




0.035  0.47** 
(0.07) 
0.036 











0.004  0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.004 
Risk Proxies Estimated at Year 
Before Purchase 

















- -  10.18** 
(3.28) 
0.614 
No. Observations  7055  6066 
Pseudo R
2 0.11  0.12 
LR Χ
2 252.66  255.65 
Prob> χ
2 0.0000  0.0000 
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